Kohlberg and Mertens argued that a solution concept to a game should be invariant under the addition or deletion of an equivalent strategy and not require the use of weakly dominated strategies.
player to a subset of his strategies, not necessarily to a single strategy. One can think for instance of tra±c rules like \drive on the right side of the road". Tra±c rules restrict the behavior of car drivers, but they are not intended to determine their behavior in all circumstances, as a single strategy would.
Similarly participation in a market typically requires adherence to certain rules which still leave room for individual decisions. We cannot expect rational players to follow a set of rules unless it is self enforcing in the sense that no player has an incentive to violate the rules as long as he expects everyone else to follow the rules. The idea to consider self-enforcing sets of rules rather than just self enforcing strategy combinations, i.e. Nash equilibria, is appealing because it will often be impossible or undesirable to agree on social conventions that perfectly determine behavior.
A set of rules is strongly self-enforcing if no player wants to violate them even if he has a slight uncertainty about everyone else following the rules. Whereas Nash equilibria are self-enforcing considering strongly self-enforcing sets of rules leads to very a di®erent, set valued concept, the persistent retracts. The latter are more akin to some set-valued concepts discussed in the literature like the primitive formations used in the theory of equilibrium selection by Harsanyi and Selten (1988) , the curb sets of Basu and Weibull (1991) and the sets closed under better replies by Ritzberger and Weibull (1996) . Balkenborg (1992) discusses a uni¯ed approach to compare these concepts. Whereas simple learning processes do often not converge to Nash-equilibrium, see e.g. Nachbar (1990) , Hofbauer and Swinkels (1995) , there are a number positive convergence results for these set valued concepts, see e.g. Hurkens (1995 ) Sanchirico (1996 and Ritzberger and Weibull (1996) . Hurkens (1995) in particular discusses a simple stochastic learning process which always converges to a persistent retract.
What distinguishes persistent retracts from the other set valued concepts are their invariance properties. Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) argued that a solution concept should not depend on modelling details. In particular they made the following two requirements on solution concepts for normal form games: a) The solutions should be invariant to the addition or deletion of payo®-equivalent strategies. b)
The solutions should not prescribe the use of weakly dominated strategies. Mertens (1987) went further and argued that we lack a theory of ordinal equivalence of games and that the solutions we consider should respect ordinal equivalence. In the theory he developed ordinal invariance can be derived from invariance requirements closely related to those above. However, b) is replaced by the slightly di®erent requirement that the solutions should only depend on the \admissible best reply structure" of a game which we will use here.
Regardless of whether one considers these requirements as indispensable or not, it is certainly useful to know whether a solution concepts satis¯es them or how it violates them. We discuss here the invariance properties of persistent equilibria and related concepts. For other solution concepts we refer to Mertens (1987) and Vermeulen and Jansen (1997a) . Some results on the invariance properties of persistent retracts and equilibria are already given in Mertens (1987) . They are summarized here for completeness.
To obtain existence of persistent equilibria, Kalai and Samet require a persistent retract to be convex.
If one is primarily interested in self-enforcing sets of rules, this restriction is not necessary. Without the convexity requirement one obtains a slightly di®erent concept which we call \persistent set". However, convexity still plays an indirect role, via the formation of beliefs. We will show that persistent retracts can be viewed as the set of beliefs associated with persistent sets.
To select among equilibria as sharply as possible, the de¯nition of a persistent retract entails a minimality condition. As in Basu and Weibull (1991) Weak invariance refers to the behavior of a solution when a payo®-equivalent strategy is deleted, invariance to the behavior when such a strategy is added or deleted. abr-invariance refers to invariance under the admissible best reply structure.
All concepts satisfy weak invariance. For persistent retracts and equilibria this was¯rst noted by that the notions of tight absorbing or persistent sets we introduce satisfy all the invariance properties and are hence ordinally invariant in the sense of Mertens (1987) . Mertens observed that persistent retracts satisfy abr-invariance. We show in addition that persistent equilibria satisfy abr-invariance for two player games, but not for games with more than two players.
In the remainder of this paper we will discuss cell by cell each entry in the table. Some basic terminology for normal form games is¯xed in Section 2. In Section 3 we introduce the solution concepts.
Loosely speaking our main result in this section states that persistent retracts correspond to the beliefs associated with a persistent set. The proof is given in the Appendix. Sections 4 and 5 start by de¯ning invariance properties and then study them for the various solution concepts. Section 6 concludes.
Preliminaries
For a natural number n, a (¯nite n-person normal form) game is a pair ¡ = hA; ui such that A :
is a product of n non-empty,¯nite sets and u = (u i ) i2N is an n-tuple of functions u i : A !IR. A i is called the set of pure strategies of player i and u i is his payo® function.
As usual, a game ¡ = hA; ui will be identi¯ed with its mixed extension. For this game, the mixed strategies of player i are the elements of the set ¢(A i ) of probability distributions on A i . By abuse of notation we will identify a pure strategy a i 2 A i with the mixed strategy in ¢(A i ) that puts all weight on a i . So, A i will simply be viewed as a subset of ¢(A i ). Pure strategy pro¯les will be denoted by a 2 A.
is the probability with which a j is played in x j . Furthermore, (x j y i ) 2 ¢ denotes the strategy pro¯le where player i uses y i 2 ¢ (A i ) and his opponents use their strategies in x 2 ¢ A . For a strategy pro¯le
is the set of best replies (of player i) to x. The strategy pro¯les in the set¯(x) := Q i¯i (x) are called best replies to x. A strategy pro¯le x 2 ¢ is called a Nash equilibrium of ¡ if x 2¯(x).
Persistent equilibria and related solution concepts
A non-empty subset R ½ ¢ A of strategy pro¯les is called a product set if R = Q i R i with R i ½ ¢ i for each player i. If the product set R is convex we call it a retract. Notice that a product set is convex if and only if each of its components is convex.
Let U be an open subset in ¢ A . We say that a set of strategies R i of player i absorbs U if R i contains a best reply against each strategy combination in U. A product set R is said to absorb U, if each of its components R i absorbs U . Remark 1. The preceding de¯nition requires a convex neighborhood for the following reason: A belief of a player i 6 = j over player j's strategy choice is a probability distribution over the mixed strategy space ¢ (A j ). For the purpose of utility maximization this belief can be identi¯ed with the expected mixed strategy it induces. Player i is certain that player j will make a strategy choice in R j µ ¢ (A j ) if the support of his belief is in R j . The expected mixed strategy will hence be in the closed convex hull of R j .
If we consider a small open neighborhood of this set, which we can itself assume to be convex, we allow for the possibility that player i is slightly uncertain about whether player j chooses a strategy in R i or not. Thus a product set R is absorbing if no player i has an incentive to violate the rule \choose in R i ", as long as he is almost certain that his opponents follow the rule \choose in R j ".
We can now proceed with the de¯nitions of the solution concepts considered in this paper: A persistent set is an absorbing set that is minimal in the following sense:
De¯nition 3.2. A persistent set is an absorbing set which does not properly contain another absorbing set.
De¯nition 3.3. Kalai and Samet (1984) A persistent retract is an absorbing retract which does not properly contain another absorbing retract.
De¯nition 3.4. Kalai and Samet (1984) A persistent equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium contained in a persistent retract.
contains a Nash equilibrium. In particular, a persistent equilibrium always exists.
If the primary interest is not in selecting among Nash equilibria, but in strongly self-enforcing sets of rules one can replace the minimality condition in the de¯nition of a persistent set / retract as follows:
De¯nition 3.5. An absorbing set (retract) R ½ ¢ A of a game ¡ is called tight if no open convex neighborhood of R is absorbed by a product set (retract) properly contained in R.
Our main result in this section states that the persistent retracts correspond to the sets of beliefs associated with persistent sets. We need the following additional notation: We denote the convex hull of a set X in some Euclidean space by conv (X). Conversely, for a closed and convex set Y we denote by ext (Y ) its set of extremal points, i.e., the set of points in Y which cannot be written as proper convex combinations of other points in Y . For general convex sets Y we de¯ne ext (Y ) as the set of extremal points of the closure of Y .
Proposition 3.6. Let ¡ be a game and let R ½ ¢ be a product set. Then the following three statements are equivalent
(ii) R is the convex hull of a persistent set of ¡.
(iii) R is closed and convex and ext(R) is a persistent set of ¡.
The same holds if \persistent" is replaced by \tight absorbing" in the previous statement.
The proof, which uses and extends several central¯ndings in Kalai and Samet (1984) , is given in the appendix. The central tool will be a careful analysis of the minimal sets of strategies of a player that absorb an open set.
It will further be shown in the appendix that every absorbing set contains a persistent set. From the above proposition it follows that every absorbing retract contains a persistent retract. Hence the persistent sets (retracts) are exactly the minimal tight absorbing sets (retracts).
Call two strategies of a player x i ; x 0 i 2 ¢ (A i ) player-equivalent if they yield the same payo® for the player regardless of the strategies played by the opponents, i.e., if we have for all y 2 ¢ A
We may still have u j (y j x i ) 6 = u j (y j x 0 i ) for some other player j 6 = i.
There will be no player-equivalent pure strategies in our examples. The following further consequence from the results in the appendix is therefore useful when studying them:
Proposition 3.7. A tight absorbing set is¯nite. If no player has two distinct player-equivalent pure strategies, then a tight absorbing set contains only pure strategy combinations. Example 3.8. The Battle-of-the-Sexes game depicted in Figure 3 .1 on the left has two persistent sets, namely f(T; L)g and f(B; R)g. There is another tight absorbing set, namely the set of all pure strategy combinations fT; Bg £ fL; Rg, but it is not minimal and hence not persistent. These solutions do not change if we add a weakly dominated strategy T 0 for player 1 to obtain the game in the middle of Figure   3 .1. Although (T; L) is no longer a strict equilibrium, i.e., it does not have a unique best reply, it is still a persistent equilibrium: As long as player 1 is almost certain that player 2 chooses L, he has no reason to switch to T 0 . However, the Nash equilibrium (T 0 ; L) is not even contained in any tight absorbing retract. Finally, the unique persistent retract of the Matching-Pennies game on the right of Figure 3 .1 is the whole strategy space ¢ fT; Bg £ ¢ fL; Rg. Consequently the unique mixed strategy equilibrium of this game is persistent.
Invariance
For the purposes of this paper we can call any map which assigns to each game ¡ a collection of subsets of ¢ A a solution concept. Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) called a solution concept invariant if, roughly speaking, the addition or deletion of pure strategies that are convex combinations of other pure strategies does not a®ect the solutions of a game. To make this precise, we have to compare (solution) sets contained in strategy spaces of di®erent dimensions. The method suggested by Mertens (1987) uses reduction maps to identify strategy pro¯les of the original game ¡ and the game ¡ 0 , where \duplicate" strategies are deleted. This method can be formalized as follows.
Let ¡ = hA; ui and ¡ 0 = hB; vi be two games
The function v i ± f denotes the composition of v i and f. For a detailed elaboration of the motivation for this particular formulation we refer to Mertens (1987) and Vermeulen and Jansen (1997b) .
This property states that every image under f of a solution of the game ¡ must be a solution of the game ¡ 0 and, conversely, that every solution of ¡ 0 is the image under f of a solution of ¡.
De¯nition 4.2. A solution concept ¾ is called invariant if it is weakly invariant and, moreover, for all
This additional property states that every strategy pro¯le of the game ¡ whose image under f is an element of a solution T of ¡ 0 must be an element of a solution S of ¡ whose image under f equals T .
The two invariance properties will now be checked for the solution concepts introduced in the previous section. We will repeatedly use the following (straightforward) Lemma:
Lemma 4.3. If f is a reduction map from a game ¡ to a game ¡ 0 , then y is a best reply to x in the game ¡ if and only if f (y) is a best reply to f (x) in the game ¡ 0 . Proof.
Let (¡; ¡
(a) Suppose that R 0 absorbs V 0 in ¡ 0 . We will show that R absorbs V . To this end, take a strategy pro¯le x 2 V . Then obviously f(x) 2 V 0 . So, since R 0 absorbs V 0 , there exists a best reply
Furthermore, there exists a strategy pro¯le y 2 R with f (y) = y 0 since f(R) = R 0 .
Then, by Lemma 4.3, y is a best reply to x.
(b) Conversely, suppose that R absorbs V in ¡. We will show that R 0 absorbs V 0 . To this end, let x 0 be a strategy pro¯le in V 0 . Then there exists a strategy pro¯le
Furthermore, there exists a best reply y 2 R to x, since R absorbs V . Then f (y) 2 R 0 is a best reply to to show that R 0 is also tight absorbing or persistent, suppose that S 0 ½ R 0 is a product set absorbing
and R are product sets. Furthermore, since S 0 ½ R 0 and R 0 = f(R), we obtain f(S) = S 0 . Therefore, by Lemma 4.4, S is a product set absorbing the convex open neighborhood
a persistent set, it cannot contain a proper product set absorbing V and hence S = R since S ½ R by de¯nition. If R is a tight absorbing set, we obtain S = R as well, since S absorbs any su±ciently small neighborhood of R. We conclude in both cases that Since S µ R and since f jR : R ! R 0 is a bijection we conclude R = S. Therefore R is tight absorbing or persistent. / (1987) already noticed that persistent retracts and persistent equilibria are weakly invariant.
Mertens
Proposition 4.6. Tight absorbing retracts, persistent retracts and persistent equilibria are weakly invariant.
Proof.
Notice that Nash equilibria are invariant by Lemma 4.3. We will only give a proof for tight absorbing retracts, since the proof for persistent retracts is completely analogous. Let (¡; ¡ 0 ; f) be a triplet with ¡
(a) Suppose that R is a persistent retract of ¡. Then ext(R) is a persistent set of ¡ by Proposition 3.6. So, by Proposition 4.5 we know that f (ext(R)) is a persistent set of ¡ 0 . Hence,
is a persistent retract of ¡ 0 by Proposition 3.6. 1 2 ); (0; 0; 1)) is a Nash-equilibrium which is mapped by f onto the persistent equilibrium in ¡, although it does itself not belong to a persistent retract or even a tight absorbing retract. Hence neither persistent or tight absorbing retracts nor persistent equilibria are invariant.
Abr-Invariance
In order to de¯ne the third notion of invariance considered in this paper, we¯rst introduce an equivalence relation for games with the same strategy spaces. Two games ¡ = hA; ui and ¡ ¤ = hA; u ¤ i are called admissible-best-reply-equivalent (abr -equivalent) if, for every completely mixed strategy pro¯le x 2 ¢, the set of best replies to x in the game ¡ coincides with the set of best replies to x in the game ¡ ¤ .
for any pair of abr-equivalent games ¡ and ¡ ¤ .
Remark 2. Abr-invariance requires¯rst of all that a solution depends only on the best-reply structure of a game and not on the actual utilities of the players. For instance, the solution concept which assigns to a game the set of all Pareto-e±cient Nash-equilibria is not abr-invariant. Secondly, a solution may actually depend only on the admissible best reply correspondence of a game. Hereby a strategy x i is called an admissible best reply against a strategy combination y if there exist a sequence of strategy combinations (y k ) k¸1 converging to y such that x i is a best reply against each strategy combination in the sequence.
(Notice the similarity to the de¯nition of a normal-form perfect equilibrium in Selten (1975) .) Because a weakly dominated strategy is never a best reply against completely mixed strategy combination, abrinvariance implies that a solution does not use weakly dominated pure strategies. (One could always decrease the payo®s to such a strategy such that it becomes strictly dominated. The resulting game would be abr-equivalent.) An abr-invariant solution concept may however contain weakly dominated mixed strategies, as we will show in Example 5.5 below. Thus abr-invariance di®ers slightly from the admissibility requirement discussed in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) . See Mertens (1987) and Vermeulen and Jansen (1997a) for further discussions on the notion of abr-invariance.
Lemma 5.2. Suppose a product set P absorbs a non-empty open set V of strategy combinations in a game ¡. Then P also absorbs V in any abr-equivalent game ¡ ¤ .
Proof.
Let V 0 be the set of all completely mixed strategy combinations in V . Then V 0 is open and dense in V . Since P absorbs V 0 in ¡ and ¡ ¤ and since the best reply correspondence is upper hemi-continuous, it follows that P absorbs V in ¡ ¤ . / Using the lemma it follows straightforwardly from the de¯nitions:
Proposition 5.3. Tight absorbing sets or retracts and persistent sets or retracts are abr-invariant.
Proposition 5.4. Persistent equilibria are abr-invariant for two-player games.
Proof. Let x = (x 1 ; x 2 ) be a persistent equilibrium of the game ¡. We have to show that x is also a persistent equilibrium of any abr-equivalent game ¡ ¤ . By Proposition 3.6 each strategy x i is in the convex hull of a set R i , where R 1 £ R 2 is a persistent set of ¡. By Proposition 5.3 R 1 £ R 2 is also a persistent set in ¡ ¤ . Thus it remains to show that x is a Nash equilibrium of ¡ ¤ . For this purpose we write each x i as a convex combination P ¡ and ¡ ¤ are abr-equivalent: Since the payo®s for players 2 and 3 are not changed in the two games it su±ces to show that the set of pure best replies of player 1 against any completely mixed strategy combination is the same in the two games. We can denote a strategy combination for the opponents by Since e 3 1 yields strictly negative payo®s in the triangle fp + q < 1g and payo® 0 along the diagonal fp + q = 1g in both games, the best replies are the same in the region fp + q 1g. It therefore remains to study the best replies on the triangle f1 < p + qg. 
The inequality is satis¯ed if In summary, the best replies on f0 < p < 1g £ f0 < q < 1g are the same in both games, i.e., the two games are abr-equivalent.
Determination of the persistent retract:
It remains to be shown that the whole strategy space is a persistent retract in ¡ and ¡ ¤ . Since both games are abr-equivalent, it su±ces to show that any persistent set of ¡ ¤ must contain all pure strategy combinations. Since the games have no playerequivalent strategies, a persistent set can only contain pure strategy combinations. 
It is therefore contained in R 1 .
(ii) Suppose now that e 2 1 2 R 1 or that e 3 1 2 R 1 . Then (e 1 2 ; e 1 3 ) 2 R 2 £ R 3 and therefore e 1 1 2 R 1 .
Step (i) implies R = A 1 £ A 2 £ A 3 , which concludes the discussion of the example.
Conclusions
We have argued that persistent sets (or tight absorbing sets) can be viewed as strongly self-enforcing sets of rules. We have seen that these solution concepts satisfy all the invariance properties discussed here. Mertens (1987) has noted that persistent retracts do not satisfy the invariance requirement related to the addition of a payo®-equivalent strategy. However, we have shown that persistent retracts correspond to the sets of beliefs associated with a persistent set. We therefore think that the lack of invariance of persistent retracts is caused by the identi¯cation of beliefs and mixed strategies.
The lack of invariance properties of persistent equilibria is more severe. It occurs because the concept does not re¯ne among the equilibria within a persistent retract, although it restricts the set of equilibria to be considered. To satisfy all invariance properties it is hence necessary to amend further re¯nement requirements to the concept. For instance, Mertens (1992) has shown that every persistent retract contains a strategically stable set as reformulated in Mertens (1989) . Such \persistent stable sets" satisfy all the invariance properties.
A. Appendix
In the following we¯x an arbitrary game ¡. We need some additional terminology before stating our¯rst Lemma. A strategy x i 2 ¢ (A i ) is called a robust best reply of player i against the strategy combination y 2 ¢ A , if x i is a best reply against all strategy combinations in a neighborhood of x in ¢ A . Any strategy which is a robust best reply against some strategy combination is called robust. We call x i a semi-robust best reply against y, if there exists a sequence (y k ) k¸0 converging to y such that x i is a robust best reply against each y k . Finally, a face of the strategy simplex ¢ (A i ) is the convex hull of a non-empty subset of pure strategies.
Lemma A.1. i) The sets of robust best replies against a strategy combination y 2 ¢ A is either empty or a full player-equivalence class that forms a face of the strategy simplex ¢ (A i ).
ii) There exists a semi-robust best reply against every strategy combination y 2 ¢ A .
iii) If x i is a semi-robust best reply against y then there is a strategy combination z arbitrarily close to y such that all best replies against z are player-equivalent to x i . i is player-equivalent to x i by Lemma 4 in Kalai and Samet (1984) . Hence the set of all robust best replies against y is a player-equivalence class. Moreover, if x 0 i is a robust best reply against y and a i a pure strategy in the support of x 0 i , then a i is a best reply against a strategy-combination whenever x 0 i is. Consequently a i is also a robust best reply against y and therefore player-equivalent to x 0 i and hence to x i . It follows that the player equivalence class of x i is a face of ¢ (A i ).
Proof. i) Suppose
ii) Consider any open neighborhood of y. By Lemma 5 in Kalai and Samet (1984) there exists a strategy combination y 0 in this neighborhood such that all best replies against y 0 are player-equivalent.
Their proof reveals moreover that all best replies against y 0 are robust best replies against y 0 . We can consequently¯nd a sequence
converging to y such that the set of best replies against each y k is equal to the set of robust best replies against y k . Since the set of best replies against y k is a face of the strategy simplex and since ¢ (A i ) has only¯nitely many faces, we can choose the sequence
such that the set of (robust) best replies against y k consists of the same face F of strategies for all k¸1.
Therefore each x i 2 F is a semi-robust best reply against y.
iii) Let x i be a semi-robust best reply against y and choose an open neighborhood U of y. By de¯nition, there exists z 2 U such that x i is a robust best reply against z and therefore an open neighborhood V µ U of z such that x i is a best reply against each z 0 2 V . By Lemma 5 in Kalai and Samet (1984) we can choose z 0 2 V such that all best replies against z 0 are player-equivalent to x i . / By the previous lemma, the set of robust strategies of a player is a non-empty disjoint union of faces of his strategy simplex. Each such face is a player-equivalence class. We denote the collection of these faces by F i . Notice that each F 2 F i will consist of a single pure strategy, if the player has no pure player-equivalent strategies. We call a non-empty subset of strategies of a player sparse, if it contains at most one strategy from each of these faces. This is equivalent to: The non-empty set consists of robust strategies which are not player-equivalent. Since the strategy simplex has only¯nitely many faces, a sparse set of strategies is¯nite. Since these faces are all disjoint, no strategy in a sparse set can be a convex combination of other strategies in the set.
Let U be a non-empty open subset of ¢ A . We say that a subset of strategies for a player tightly absorbs U if it absorbs U while no proper subset absorbs U . A product set tightly absorbs U , if each of its components does.
Lemma A.2. Let U be a non-empty open subset of ¢ A . Then: a) Every strategy set of a player that absorbs U contains a subset that tightly absorbs U.
b) A strategy set that tightly absorbs U is sparse.
Proof.
Suppose R i absorbs U . Let R 0 i denote the set of strategies in R i that are semi-robust best replies against some strategy combination in U . Lemma A.1 ii) and iii) implies that R Proof. Let R be an absorbing set. Using Lemma A.2 a) we can¯nd a product set R 0 µ R that tightly
absorbs some convex open neighborhood U of R. R 0 is¯nite since each of its components is sparse. If R 0 is not a persistent set, then it will properly contain an absorbing set. If the latter is not persistent, it will again properly contain some absorbing set etc. Since R 0 is¯nite, we will¯nd after¯nitely many steps an absorbing set that does not properly contain an absorbing set, i.e., a persistent set. /
We have now all the tools to give the:
Proof of Proposition 3.6. We only give the proof for persistency. The proof for tight absorbing sets/retracts is similar.
(i) implies (ii): Let R be a persistent retract. By Proposition A.4 R contains a persistent set R 0 µ R.
Then conv (R 0 ) µ R is an absorbing retract and therefore R = conv (R 0 ).
(ii) implies (iii): Let R = conv (R 0 ), where R 0 is a persistent set. Since each R 0 i is a sparse, it consists of¯nitely many strategies lying on disjoint faces of ¢ (A i ). We obtain ext (R i ) = ext (conv (R for each player i and hence ext (R) = R 0 . Moreover, R is closed and convex.
(iii) implies (i): Since R is convex, ext (R) = R 0 and R 0 is¯nite, we obtain R = conv (R 0 ). An absorbing retract R 00 contained in R must contain a persistent set by Proposition A.3. But this persistent set must be R 0 . Hence conv (R 0 ) µ R 00 µ R = conv (R 0 ) since conv (R 0 ) and R are closed. Therefore R is a persistent retract. /
